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“MAJOR QUESTIONS” AS MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES
Riley T. Svikhart*
“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”1

INTRODUCTION
Just three days after securing complete control of Congress in a dominant midterm election that netted their party nine additional Senate seats
and a strengthened House majority,2 Republican opponents of President
Barack Obama’s signature healthcare legislation received more good news in
the Supreme Court’s announcement that it would hear King v. Burwell.3 The
case—in which challengers asserted that residents of states that had declined
to establish health insurance exchanges were ineligible to receive tax credits
for the purchase of health insurance through federally created exchanges4—
offered what would likely be a final chance for opponents of the Affordable
Care Act5 to dismantle the sweeping law by judicial review.6
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics & Business, Westmont College, 2015. I dedicate this Note to my parents and
family in tremendous gratitude for their love and support. I would like to thank Professor
Bill Kelley and Mathew Hoffmann for their critiques, and I am grateful to the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their tireless and skillful editing.
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (ABA 2009).
2 Guy Benson, Final Score: GOP Gains Nine Senate Seats, Will Hold 54–46 Majority,
TOWNHALL (Dec. 8, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2014/12/08/finalscore-gop-gains-nine-senate-seats-will-hold-5446-majority-n1928620.
3 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (mem.).
4 James Surowiecki, On Obamacare, the G.O.P. Lays a Trap for Itself, NEW YORKER (Nov.
18, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/obamacare-g-o-p-lays-trap.
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
6 Surely, other discrete aspects of “Obamacare” have continued to fuel litigation in
the wake of King. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
(evaluating the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate as
applied to religious employers). But in the run-up to King, many observers regarded the
case to represent the most significant existential threat to Obamacare since twenty-six
states and numerous other entities challenged the law’s constitutionality in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–96 (2012) (upholding the
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to tax).
See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Here’s What the Supreme Court Could Do to Insurance Premiums in Your
State, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 11, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120233/king-v1873
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When the Court ultimately held for the Obama Administration,7 the ruling’s implications on the future of “Obamacare” dominated the public’s
attention.8 However, this political focus obscured another important legal
ramification tucked away in Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion—in
refusing to afford Chevron9 deference to the IRS’s interpretation of the
ambiguous legislative draftsmanship at issue,10 the Court gave new life to the
“major question exception.”11 This exception, its companion legal doctrines,
and its potential to play a critical role in restoring the separation and balance
of powers envisioned by the framers of our Constitution will be the subject of
this Note. Against the backdrop of this discussion, this Note will argue that
faithfulness to the Constitution demands that federal courts reinvigorate
their reliance on the exception in a narrow and principled way.
The future of the major question exception is a live question in the wake
of King. This Note calls on federal courts to embrace the exception, for
where a toothless nondelegation doctrine has failed to curtail the ceaseless
growth of executive power experienced over the past century, a more aggressively applied major question exception can succeed in ensuring that policy
questions of the deepest “economic and political significance”12 are left
exclusively to the people’s representatives in Congress. In declining to defer
to an executive agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, federal
courts must themselves assume “the task [of] determin[ing] the correct reading” of Congress’s work.13 This move aggrandizes federal judges and
lawmakers at the expense of regulators, but achieves a worthwhile result of
burwell-how-supreme-court-could-wreck-obamacare-states; Stephanie Mencimer, The Supreme Court Is About to Hear the Case That Could Destroy Obamacare, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 9,
2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/king-burwell-supreme-court-oba
macare.
7 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
8 See, e.g., Kimberly Leonard, Supreme Court Upholds Obamacare Subsidies, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 25, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/25/
supreme-court-upholds-obamacare-subsidies-in-king-v-burwell (“The ruling . . . deals a crippling blow to the law’s Republican opponents . . . .”).
9 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. For an in-depth account of the Affordable Care Act’s complex road to passage, see generally John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care
Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131 (2013).
11 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013) (“[W]e have applied
Chevron where concerns about agency self-aggrandizement are at their apogee: in cases
where an agency’s expansive construction of the extent of its own power would have
wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”). Certainly, if such a “fundamental change” were itself incapable of triggering the major question exception, the
exception could be fairly regarded as something of an afterthought prior to King. See also
David Baake, Obituary: Chevron’s “Major Questions Exception,” HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. BLOG
(Aug. 27, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://harvardelr.com/2013/08/27/obituary-chevrons-majorquestions-exception/ (observing in the wake of City of Arlington that “reports of [the exception’s] death appear to have been entirely accurate”).
12 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
13 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
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blunting overgrown executive power in the process. And while increased
reliance on the exception is surely incapable of completely reapportioning
domestic policymaking power among the three branches,14 it will also do
little to upset the modern reality that agencies must bear the responsibility of
being detailed where Congress has only the ability to be general. Viewed
through this lens, this Note’s core contention becomes clear—major questions are major opportunities.
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will review the baseline
doctrine provided by Chevron. Part II will chronicle the legal history of the
major question exception. And Part III will make the aforementioned practical and constitutional argument; documenting the broad expansion of executive power that has accompanied Congress’s increased tendency to rely
exclusively on agencies to craft policy details in Section III.A, and arguing for
a reinvigorated conception of the major question exception in Section III.B.
I.

CHEVRON DEFERENCE: THE BASICS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,15 has become an essential staple of administrative law.16
Before examining Chevron and the doctrine it has created, an initial look at
the sort of situations in which the doctrine applies is warranted.
In an era in which Congress is forced to leave executive agencies considerable discretion to fill in policy details,17 agencies must nevertheless tailor
their actions to statutes passed by Congress. Though the Supreme Court has
been extraordinarily accommodative of Congress’s routine desire to grant
executive agencies broad authority to fill in the blanks in pursuit of certain
14 Whether such a reapportionment would be warranted in a world free of the modern
realities that necessitate broad delegation is a separate issue. Compare Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002) (offering an originalist defense of the
nondelegation doctrine), and Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)
(advocating “pragmatic formalism” as a judicial mechanism for maintaining the separation
of powers), with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (denying the existence of a nondelegation doctrine), and
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J.
97 (2000) (defending the robustness of today’s administrative state).
15 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16 Indeed, the case “has become the most cited Supreme Court decision in history and
the subject of a scholarly literature that would fill libraries.” GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 568 (7th ed. 2016). In his highly influential article, Chevron Step Zero, Cass
Sunstein observed the case’s tremendous impact.
As a sign of Chevron’s influence, consider the fact that the decision was cited 2414
times in its first decade (between 1984 and January 1, 1994), 2584 times in its next
six years (between January 1, 1994 and January 1, 2000), and 2235 times in its
next five years (between January 1, 2000 and January 28, 2005).
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 n.1 (2006) (citation omitted).
17 See infra Section III.A for a discussion of the reasons behind this modern
phenomenon.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL414.txt

1876

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

4-MAY-17

9:32

[vol. 92:4

policy objectives, it has always acknowledged that naked congressional delegations of legislative power are unconstitutional.18 Thus, in order to avoid
running afoul of the Constitution, Congress must “lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized [to act] is
directed to conform.”19 In practice, this standard has been remarkably easy
for Congress to meet.20 Indeed, only two statutes in history have flunked this
test.21
Open-ended legislative arrangements rubber-stamped by the Court have
included: the Communications Act’s empowerment of the FCC to act as
“public convenience, interest, or necessity requires;”22 the Renegotiation
Act’s creation of a Renegotiation Board tasked with determining “excessive
profits;”23 the Public Utility Holding Company Act’s authorization of the SEC
to stamp out “unfair[ ] or inequitabl[e]” distributions of voting power;24 and,
the Emergency Price Control Act’s creation of a Price Administrator to
“effectuate the purposes of [the] Act” by fixing “fair and equitable” commodity prices.25
Under the resulting legal regime, the nondelegation doctrine is indeed
a “dead letter,”26 and Congress is free in practice to leave statutes as designedly vague as it pleases.27 Quite commonly, then, executive agencies are
charged with issuing rules and adjudications that bind the public at a greater
18 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The Constitution
provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States’ . . . and we have long insisted that ‘the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.” (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1;
and then quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))).
19 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
20 See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 142 (2011) (“Although the Court has not formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, it has upheld many sweeping delegations of lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies.” (footnote omitted)).
21 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Because these lone judicial invalidations each occurred
in 1935, Professor Sunstein has famously observed that “the [nondelegation] doctrine has
had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).” Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
22 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943).
23 Pub. L. No. 82-9, 65 Stat. 7 (1951); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785–86
(1948). For a detailed discussion of the Act, see Robert Braucher, The Renegotiation Act of
1951, 66 HARV. L. REV. 270 (1952).
24 Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005); Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S.
90, 105 (1946) (alteration in original).
25 Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427
(1944).
26 Lawson, supra note 14, at 329.
27 See infra Section III.A for a discussion of the many incentives Congress has for
doing so.
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level of specificity than whatever broad outlines Congress provided.28 Any
such action on the agency’s part must be based on a permissible interpretation of the underlying statute from which the agency gleans its authority to
act in the first place.29 Thus, parties opposed to a regulation often seek to
persuade reviewing courts that an agency based the regulation on a flawed
interpretation of the organic statute at issue. The famous two-step inquiry
outlined by the Court in Chevron deals with this type of case, functionally
tipping the scale in favor of agencies by instructing reviewing courts to defer
to any reasonable statutory interpretation proffered by the agency.30
Formally speaking, Chevron directs courts to first assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”31 If the court finds
“the intent of Congress [to be] clear,” it may disregard the agency’s interpretation and “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”32 If, on the other hand, the court deems the statute to be “silent or
ambiguous with respect to the [interpretive question],” then it must uphold
any “permissible construction of the statute” adopted by the agency.33 “The
court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding.”34 Thus, as long as an agency’s resolution of a statutory
ambiguity is reasonable, its “position [with respect to that ambiguity]
prevails” under Chevron.35
For all its simplicity, Chevron relies on no shortage of persuasive theoretical justifications.36 Indeed, although separate camps have emerged along
familiar lines with respect to Chevron’s actual application, Chevron’s principal
28 See generally Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982) (discussing this tendency and its theoretical implications).
29 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
30 See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA.
L. REV. 597 (2009).
31 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
32 Id. at 842–43.
33 Id. at 843.
34 Id. at 843 n.11.
35 Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012). The categorical simplicity of this inquiry has surely contributed to its lasting success. Chevron’s most influential
predecessor offered a standards-based framework that was much more cumbersome and
unpredictable. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The [degree of
deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation] will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”); see also
Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562
n.95 (1985) (listing ten criteria used by the Court in cases preceding Chevron). The complexity of such an evaluation made Chevron’s simplification particularly refreshing for
lower courts, for in the words of Gary Lawson, “[n]o judge really wants to apply a ten-factor
test to a foundational inquiry in administrative law cases.” LAWSON, supra note 16, at 560.
36 See generally Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271 (2008).
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rationale is one that Justice Breyer37 and Justice Scalia38 always agreed upon:
“Courts defer to agency interpretations of law when, and because, Congress
has told them to do so.”39
Broadly speaking, Congress issues this “implicit . . . delegation of lawinterpreting power to administrative agencies”40 in the recognition that
resolving statutory ambiguities necessitates policymaking, a function better
performed by “those with great expertise,” who, as agents of the president,
are “accountable to the people” for “resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light
of everyday realities.”41 Agencies are expert and accountable; courts are not.
Of course, Congress retains the constitutional prerogative to deny agencies this interpretive function, as in the ordinary course Congress alone has
the power to legislate,42 and the judiciary alone the power “to say what the
law is.”43 This reality requires federal courts to engage in a threshold consideration of whether Congress has indeed intended to delegate interpretive
authority to the agency at issue.44 Here, what Thomas Merrill and Kristin E.
Hickman have famously dubbed “Chevron Step Zero,”45 became “the central
location of an intense and longstanding disagreement” between Justices
Breyer and Scalia that remains largely unresolved today.46 While Justice
Breyer’s favored approach would require a functional evaluation of Congress’s most likely intention in the particular case at hand,47 Justice Scalia’s
approach would instead call on courts to establish and maintain “a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.”48
37 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 370–82 (1986).
38 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 516–17.
39 Sunstein, supra note 16, at 197–98.
40 Id. at 192.
41 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.”).
43 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
44 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1882 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he ‘category of interpretive choices’ to which Chevron deference applies is defined by
congressional intent.” (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001))).
45 Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 593, 598 n.10 (2008).
46 Sunstein, supra note 16, at 192.
47 Breyer, supra note 37, at 371. For a representative example of Justice Breyer’s grappling with Chevron during his tenure on the First Circuit, see Mayburg v. Secretary of Health
& Human Services, 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
48 Scalia, supra note 38, at 517. For a timeless exposition of Justice Scalia’s influential
approach to these kinds of questions by the late Justice himself, see Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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This classic tension between formalism and functionalism is not unique
to Chevron, but has still prompted the Court to formally consider when deference is appropriate under a preliminary finding that Congress has indeed
enacted the statute at issue with a fictional intent to delegate interpretive
authority to the responsible agency.49 In United States v. Mead Corp.,50 the
Court implemented a framework for distinguishing those delegations that
trigger Chevron deference from those that do not. Under Mead, deference is
owed to an agency where “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”51 In practice, then, “two factors . . . signal a delegation”52 that
places an interpretation under Chevron’s “domain”53: “express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed” and “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”54
Although Justice Scalia protested vigorously against the “enormous, and
almost uniformly bad” implications he believed Mead would engender, he
did so alone.55 In an 8-1 ruling, the Supreme Court allowed Chevron to coexist with its more complicated predecessor Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,56 and
refused to declare Chevron “the sole measure of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statutes” by “relegat[ing Skidmore] to the dustbin of history
as an ‘anachronism’ ” as Justice Scalia would have preferred.57 Although
Scalia’s warning that the Court’s failure to lay Skidmore to rest would create
uncertainty58 has proved prescient in a handful of relatively rare circum49 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97
VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011) (“The framework for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation rests on a legal fiction: Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority
to federal agencies whenever it fails to resolve clearly the meaning of statutory language.”).
50 533 U.S. 218 (2001). It bears noting that, while it does represent the Court’s most
famous attempt to settle the scope of Chevron, Mead was not the first case in which the
Court grappled with questions of this nature. See also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S.
576 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809–11 (2002) (summarizing Christensen).
51 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
52 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 799, 805 (2010).
53 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001).
54 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, 230.
55 Id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
57 Merrill, supra note 50, at 808 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
58 Recall that Skidmore and its sister pre-Chevron cases used a complicated multitude of
factors to determine the degree of deference deserved by an agency. See Diver, supra note
35, at 562 n.95. For a more comprehensive examination of the modern interplay between
Skidmore and Chevron, see Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001).
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stances,59 lower courts have continued to apply broad Chevron deference
where Mead allows with tremendous regularity.60 As a result, where statutory
interpretations by administrative agencies are concerned, Chevron is king.
II.

THE MAJOR QUESTION EXCEPTION

While Chevron’s rule over the vast landscape of administrative law has
been virtually uninterrupted since its announcement in 1984, the Supreme
Court has introduced an additional threshold consideration in a subset of
“major question” cases. Like the evaluation under Mead, the major question
exception derails the Chevron analysis at “Step Zero” when triggered.61
Under the controversial exception,62 reviewing courts can deny Chevron deference to “agency interpretations that effect major changes” in American
policy.63 From birth, to death, to rebirth under King v. Burwell, this Part
charts the doctrinal evolution of the modern major question exception.
The major question exception traces its origins to the 1994 case of MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.64 Invalidating an FCC rule exempting
competitors of AT&T from certain tariff-filing requirements under section
203(b)(2) of the Communications Act,65 the Supreme Court observed the
great unlikelihood that “Congress would leave the determination of whether
an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency
discretion.”66 Noting the “major[ness]”67 and “fundamental[ity]”68 of the
59 See, e.g., River St. Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“Some Circuits including this one have applied the Skidmore standard when examining
non-precedential agency decisions.” (first citing Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 79–80 (1st Cir.
2009); then citing Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2008); then
citing Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2008); and then citing OrtegaCervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007))).
60 Recall that Chevron remains the Supreme Court’s most cited decision. LAWSON,
supra note 16, at 568.
61 See Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 598 (labeling MCI and Brown & Williamson as Step
Zero cases); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 236 (observing major question cases to “bear on
the Step Zero question of whether Chevron applies”).
62 A strong preponderance of criticism of the major question exception has been negative. See, e.g., Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 481 (2015);
Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19
(2010); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223; Matthew A. Melone, King v. Burwell and the Chevron Doctrine: Did the Court Invite
Judicial Activism?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 663 (2016); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 236–42;
Michael C. Pollack, Note, Chevron’s Regrets: The Persistent Vitality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 316 (2011); Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191
(2016).
63 Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 598.
64 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
65 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2012).
66 MCI, 512 U.S. at 231.
67 Id. at 227–29.
68 Id. at 231–32.
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FCC’s purported “modification” of such an “essential characteristic”69 of the
industry at issue, the Court denied the agency Chevron deference with respect
to its favored interpretation of “modify” and signaled the possible existence
of a brand new threshold evaluation.
In the aftermath of MCI, however, “the case’s necessary focus on the
word ‘modify’ arguably made the majorness distinction uniquely relevant
[to] MCI.”70 The Court entertained a possible major question issue in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,71 but its “cryptic”72
discussion of the issue in that case did little to ease the confusion generated
by MCI’s treatment of the question. Consequently, the Court’s subsequent
ruling in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.73 is roundly viewed to have
heralded the arrival of the modern major question exception.74
In Brown & Williamson, the Court explained the reasoning behind its
refusal to defer to the FDA’s interpretation of “drug” under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act75 (FDCA) in a considerably more unambiguous fashion.
Observing that the agency’s preferred interpretation would group nicotine
among a category of “dangerous” drugs incapable of safe usage and subject
to prohibition under the FDCA, a 5-4 majority rejected the agency’s interpretive decision to include cigarettes and other tobacco products under section
203(g)(1)(C)’s definition of “drugs” due to its “confiden[ce] that Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency.”76 In other words, “Congress could not have
intended the statutory definition of ‘drug’ to encompass nicotine because
Congress could not have intended to authorize FDA’s criminalization of the
entire tobacco industry.”77
Though Brown & Williamson generated considerable hand-wringing
among certain commentators,78 a series of cases embraced its reasoning79
69 Id. at 231.
70 Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 600.
71 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
72 Sunstein, supra note 16, at 239.
73 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
74 The King majority traced the existence of the major question exception back to
Brown & Williamson, citing the case indirectly through the vehicle of the more recent Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which quoted Brown & Williamson.
In addition, most casebooks begin their discussions of the major question exception with
Brown & Williamson. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 16, at 656; JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW
C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 819 (2d ed. 2013).
75 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–97 (2012).
76 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
77 Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 602.
78 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 62, at 237 (“[T]he Court’s practice of aggressively
narrowing administrative statutes to avoid serious nondelegation concerns . . . raises serious . . . legitimacy concerns . . . .”); see also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“Presidents, just like Members of Congress, are elected by the public. . . . I
do not believe that an administrative agency decision of this magnitude . . . can escape the
kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any democracy. And such a review will take place
whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that makes the relevant decision.”).
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until Massachusetts v. EPA80 brought about its “death” in 2007.81 In an apparent reversal of its stance with respect to the major questions at issue in MCI
and Brown & Williamson, the Court withheld Chevron deference from the
EPA in spite of the agency’s attempt to adhere to Brown & Williamson by
selecting an interpretation that would curb, rather than amplify, the economic and political ramifications of the rule.82 Despite the fact that the EPA
intentionally confined the ambit of its rule by interpreting section 202(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act to forbid its regulation of certain vehicular emissions,
the Court held the statute to “unambiguous[ly]” contravene EPA’s interpretation as, in the Court’s view, the greenhouse gases at issue were “without a
doubt ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . .
the ambient air.’ ”83
In Massachusetts, as in MCI and Brown & Williamson, the Court reflected
on the majorness of the policy question at issue.84 Irreconcilably, however,
the Massachusetts Court held that very majorness to compel the EPA’s involvement in the matter.85 Whereas the MCI and Brown & Williamson majorities
sidelined the responsible executive agencies from the effort to discern the
correct answer to a highly important interpretive question, the Massachusetts
Court did just the opposite, prompting many commentators to eulogize
Brown & Williamson and the nascent major question exception.
A handful of others, however, were perceptive in their attempts to reconcile the divergent cases, as indeed the exception was not yet dead and would
be invoked just six years later in King v. Burwell.86 Perhaps the best of these
explanations was advanced by Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, who
argued that the Massachusetts Court’s repudiation of the EPA amounted to
“expertise-forcing,” rather than a wholesale rejection of the brand of reasoning employed in MCI and Brown & Williamson.87 Grouping Massachusetts
79 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (withholding deference
because “[t]he idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual
authority through an implicit delegation . . . is not sustainable”); Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (conversely granting deference due to the “interstitial” quality of the
interpretation at issue); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)
(“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”
(first citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); and then citing
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60)).
80 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
81 Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 603 (“Seven years later, the major questions exception
died.”) (emphasis added).
82 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530.
83 Id. at 529 (alterations in original).
84 The Court accepted the petitioners’ argument that climate change represents the
“most pressing environmental challenge of our time.” Id. at 505 (quoting Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120)).
85 Id.
86 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
87 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 53.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL414.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 11

“major questions” as major opportunities

4-MAY-17

9:32

1883

with Gonzales v. Oregon88 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld89—other cases in which the
Court rejected legal interpretations of the George W. Bush Administration—
Freeman and Vermeule argued that the disparate result in Massachusetts
could be explained by the decision of “Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy
[to join] forces to override executive positions that they found untrustworthy, in the sense that executive expertise had been subordinated to politics.”90 On this reading, the Bush EPA’s decision not to regulate vehicular
emissions for compliance with the Clean Air Act amounted to an unlawful
“politicization of administrative expertise” that the Supreme Court felt compelled to strike down.91
Whatever the appeal of this explanation, the Court’s subsequent ruling
in City of Arlington v. FCC92 dealt the seemingly dormant major question
exception an additional blow. In holding that courts remain bound by Chevron even when the statutory ambiguity at issue pertains to the agency’s jurisdiction over a policy matter,93 the Court dispensed with another prominent
justification for the major question exception—namely, that Chevron deference does not apply in cases where agencies have engaged in “[s]elf-aggrandizing interpretations” that constitute “unscrupulous power-grab[s] rather
than responsible lawmaking.”94 On this view, the problem with the FDA’s
decision to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco products as “drugs” under
the FDCA was that, in so doing, the agency “attempt[ed] to dramatically
expand its substantive jurisdiction.”95 The City of Arlington Court rejected
that understanding in a masterful opinion by Justice Scalia, dismissing the
existence of any distinction between “big, important” interpretations defining the agency’s “jurisdiction,” and other “humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff.”96
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s revival of the exception in King v. Burwell97
understandably came as a surprise. Called on to resolve a circuit split over
what at first seemed like a quintessential Chevron question98—whether the
ACA’s provision of tax credits for health insurance plans purchased “through
88 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (invalidating the rule of the Bush Attorney General prohibiting
doctors from prescribing drugs in aid of physician-assisted suicide).
89 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that trial by military commission violated the Geneva
Convention and the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
90 Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 87, at 52.
91 Id. For a similar argument that agencies “bear[ ] a legal and ethical duty to select
the best interpretation of [their] governing statute[s]” regardless of their “policy preferences,” see Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1231,
1232 (2016).
92 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
93 Id. at 1874.
94 Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 614.
95 Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 203, 250 (2004).
96 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
97 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
98 See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 367–76 (4th Cir. 2014) (evaluating the IRS’s interpretation under the two-step Chevron framework); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 398–402
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (same).
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an Exchange established by the State under [section] 1311” of the Act99
authorized the IRS to extend those same credits to residents forced to
purchase health insurance though a federally created exchange as a result of
their state’s refusal to establish its own exchange—the Court cited Brown &
Williamson and denied the IRS Chevron deference altogether.100 After initially observing that Chevron’s two-step framework ordinarily applies where
administrative interpretations of statutory ambiguities are involved, the Court
categorized the case at hand as “one of those” “extraordinary cases [where]
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has
intended” an “implicit delegation” “to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps.”101 Here, where the interpretive question at issue concerned one of
“the Act’s key reforms” and would affect the price of health insurance and
the federal budget tremendously, the legal question was of such “deep ‘economic and political significance’ ” as to belie the threshold finding that Congress would have intended to delegate resolution of the question to the
IRS.102 Simply put, “[t]his [was] not a case for the IRS.”103
Taking the interpretive question for itself, the Court ultimately arrived at
the same interpretation as the IRS.104 But in so doing, the Court not only
rekindled the major question exception, but lent it further power by employing it in an unprecedented fashion. Whereas previous major question departures from Chevron had occurred in cases where a reviewing court broke with
the responsible agency’s favored interpretation, in King the Court denied the
agency Chevron deference but adopted its statutory interpretation anyway.
Thus, King differed from MCI and Brown & Williamson in the sense that the
Court could not be understood to have utilized the exception in an effort to
supplement the reasoning behind its rejection of an agency interpretation
with which it disagreed, but instead invoked the exception due to the sheer
economic and political significance of the legal question at issue.
In addition, whereas previous invocations of the exception had been
employed to resolve various problems of “bare majorness,”105 “agency
aggrandizement,”106 and “excessive delegation[ ],”107 the King Court added
another rationale for denying the IRS deference—namely, the substantial
unlikelihood “that Congress would have delegated this [interpretive] decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of
99 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
100 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
101 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
102 Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2496 (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance
markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is
consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent
with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we adopt.”).
105 See Moncrieff, supra note 45, at 611–13.
106 See id. at 613–16.
107 See id. at 616–20.
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this sort.”108 While this “lack of expertise” ground was not completely
unprecedented,109 it presumably broadens the applicability of the exception
in the wake of King.
Although King remains fresh and federal courts have had little opportunity to respond to its version of the major question exception, some lower
courts and litigants have already begun to employ the case’s reasoning.110
In the term following King, for instance, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a case111 in which twenty-six states sought to invalidate a pair of
high-profile DHS programs that granted enhanced legal status to illegal
immigrants that were parents of citizens or lawful permanent residents
(DAPA)112 and shielded certain undocumented immigrants that entered the
United States as children from deportation (DACA).113 Observing that
“DAPA would make 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for lawful
presence, employment authorization, and associated benefits,” the Fifth Circuit cited King in concluding that such a policy question “undoubtedly implicates ‘question[s] of deep economic and political significance.’ ”114
Nevertheless, the court elected to “assum[e] arguendo that Chevron applies,”
and proceeded to complete its remaining analysis.115 Short a Justice, the
Supreme Court failed to address the applicability (or lack thereof) of the
major question exception in a one-sentence per curiam opinion affirming
the Fifth Circuit’s decision by an equally divided Court.116
108 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006)).
109 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 266 (“The structure of the CSA . . . conveys unwillingness to
cede medical judgments to an executive official who lacks medical expertise.”).
110 See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that
Chevron applied because “[t]his is not an ‘extraordinary’ case” (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at
2488)); id. at 1031–32 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Deference
under [Chevron] is categorically unavailable” in “extraordinary cases.” (quoting King, 135
S. Ct. at 2488 (internal quotation marks omitted))); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134,
178, 181–82 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ssuming arguendo that Chevron applies” as the statute at
issue “undoubtedly implicates” major questions); Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
796 F.3d 1338, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should not nonchalantly defer to an agency’s interpretation for questions of ‘deep economic and political
significance.’” (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89)); Land of Lincoln Mut. Health Ins. Co.
v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 81, 106 (2016) (the plaintiff relying on King “[i]n resisting
deference”).
111 See Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
112 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter DAPA Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_
memo_deferred_action.pdf.
113 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David
V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DACA Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discre
tion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
114 See Texas, 809 F.3d at 181 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489).
115 Id. at 182.
116 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
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Until federal courts are presented with more opportunities to invoke the
exception, the generative capacity of King will remain to be seen. The
remainder of this Note will attempt to defend King’s version of the major
question exception in hopes of urging federal courts to follow suit in denying
executive agencies Chevron deference over statutory interpretations of
extraordinary economic and political significance.
III.

ARGUMENT: THE NEED

FOR A

ROBUST MAJOR QUESTION EXCEPTION

In its various forms, the major question exception has won the affirmation of all but one active Supreme Court Justice at one time or another. Two
of the three Justices commonly thought to form the Court’s more conservative bloc—Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas—have joined majority
opinions invoking the exception.117 Elsewhere, the Court’s more liberal Justices—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—have embraced the
exception as well.118 And the Court’s influential “swing” Justice,119 Anthony
Kennedy, holds the lone distinction of having voted with the exception-invoking majorities in both Brown & Williamson and King.120 In the coming
months, these Justices will likely welcome Judge Neil Gorsuch to the Court,
who recently questioned whether “the time has come to face the behemoth”
of Chevron in a magisterial concurrence calling for a pointed reconsideration
of Chevron’s basis under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the
Constitution’s “deliberate design.”121 If Judge Gorsuch harbors such fundamental concerns with Chevron itself, then it is no stretch to suggest that he
117 Chief Justice Roberts authored the Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2484 (2015), while Justice Thomas joined Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000). For what it’s worth, the
late Justice Scalia joined the latter opinion as well. Id. And it is also quite probable that
Justice Alito, who was not around for Brown & Williamson, would have joined Justices Scalia
and Thomas in the Brown & Williamson majority if he had had the chance. See Jeremy
Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most and Least Often, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/24/upshot/24up-scotus-agreement-rates.html (observing that in the four terms preceding the article’s publication, Justice Alito agreed with Justices Scalia and Thomas in eighty-six percent and ninety-one
percent of cases respectively).
118 Indeed, each of these Justices joined the Chief Justice’s majority opinion in King,
135 S. Ct. at 2484.
119 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The “Administrative
Side” of Chief Justice Roberts, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 33, 61 (2015).
120 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 123.
121 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1150 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In his opening paragraph, Gorsuch calls Chevron an “elephant in the
room” that “permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial
and legislative power and concentrate[s] federal power in a way that seems more than a
little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” Id. Gorsuch’s criticism coincides with a shift away from Chevron that has gathered increasing momentum in
recent years. See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1867, 1868 (2015) (“Chevron’s condition [is], if not terminal, at least serious.”).
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would likely have no qualms invoking the major question exception in certain cases that would otherwise be governed by Chevron.122
Of course, the vote of any jurist reflects their comprehensive evaluation
of the case at hand, and not merely their opinion as to the legal merits of the
court’s use of competing doctrines such as the major question exception in
reaching its final decision. Admittedly, this fact may cloud whatever signals
can be drawn from the Court’s voting patterns in Brown & Williamson and
King.123
Still, the fact that the exception has been applied uniformly across ordinary ideological lines offers a strong starting point for the forthcoming constitutional argument—the theoretical impulse for the major question
exception is rooted in common ground.
In its chief concern of preserving the separation of powers understood
by James Madison and his contemporaries to be so vital,124 the major question exception seeks a constitutional end the legitimacy and value of which
few would deny. When thus viewed as a supplement to a nonexistent
nondelegation doctrine, the strength of the imperative behind the exception
is clear.
With that in mind, this Part will argue that the attractiveness of the
major question exception’s noble objective outweighs the practical difficulties inherent in the task of shaping and enforcing judicially manageable standards and rules for the exception’s future application. First, this Part will
briefly highlight the problem the major question exception can help
address—namely, a runaway administrative state that has enabled the executive branch to far outgrow its proper role in the constitutional scheme as a
result of a weak nondelegation doctrine and broad judicial deference under
Chevron. Next, this Part will offer a constitutional defense of the major question exception, and will encourage the development of rules and standards
that will enable courts to apply the exception in a manner that does not
swallow the many positive aspects of the existing rule.
A.

Problem: A Weakened Separation of Powers in an Era
of Administrative Dominance

The dominance of administrative agencies in modern American government is virtually irrefutable.125 In 2015 alone, the Federal Register weighed in
122 Indeed, one who is willing to consider removing the foundation of a house (Chevron
deference in all cases) would be exceedingly unlikely to protest the removal of certain rooms
from that house (Chevron deference in “major question” cases).
123 Perhaps, as some suggest, this sort of tea-leaf reading obscures a more fundamental
point that Justices vote “to advance favored policies and to win approval from audiences
they care about.” See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010). See generally Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
124 See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
125 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged as much. See, e.g., Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (plurality opinion)
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at 82,035 pages.126 The final rule that brings that year of regulation to a
close provides an illustrative case study. Issued by the Department of Agriculture, the rule sweeps broadly, covering in mind-numbing detail such diverse
subjects as Christmas trees,127 watermelons,128 popcorn,129 softwood lumber,130 and paper-based packaging.131
Needless to say, Congress’s delegation of this kind of granular policymaking to administrative agencies is good and healthy. It is also constitutional.132 Congress delegates such authority under heavy practical
constraints and in response to several reasonable incentives—chiefly, its prohibitive lack of time and expertise.
Space on the crowded legislative agenda of Congress is precious,133 and
decisions as to the proper application of commodity promotion laws to milk
cartons, as in the case study above, are normally undeserving of Congress’s
limited attention. Equally fundamental to the delegation equation is the fact
that even if Congress did want to take up such a specific question, it would
likely have no idea where to begin in crafting a sensible answer. Indeed, in
the paradigmatic arenas of environmental, energy, securities, and drug regulation, rulemakings are the product of exhaustive consideration and extensive legwork by highly skilled specialists that simply overmatch members of
Congress and federal judges in technical expertise.134
Add to these constraints constant partisan gridlock within a designedly
slow legislative process of bicameralism and presentment135 that precludes
Congress from swiftly responding to emerging regulatory issues and ever
(“[T]he Executive Branch . . . wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily
life . . . .”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (“[T]he administrative state with its
reams of regulations would leave [the framers] rubbing their eyes.”) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
126 Exemption of Organic Products from Assessment Under a Commodity Promotion
Law, 80 Fed. Reg. 82,006, 82,035 (Dec. 31, 2015) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 900, 1150,
1160, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1212, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220,
1221, 1222, 1230, 1260, and 1280) (final rule issued in 2015 ending that year’s Federal
Register on page 82,035).
127 Id. at 82,028.
128 Id. at 82,026–27.
129 Id. at 82,028–29.
130 Id. at 82,029–30.
131 Id. at 82,032–33.
132 See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text.
133 With its long recesses and Fridays off, Congress seldom works in the classic, Schoolhouse Rock! sense. See, e.g., John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Congress Plans Huge Break
During Summer 2016, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.politico.com/blogs/the-gavel/
2015/11/house-2016-schedule-215476 (noting that for the entire 2016 calendar year, “the
House [was] scheduled to be in session for 111 days”).
134 The Supreme Court summed up this view in the 1989 case of Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
135 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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changing circumstances, and the affirmative desirability of leaving the details
to regulatory agencies becomes readily apparent.136
This fact was not lost on Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama,
who—spurred by a “do-nothing Congress” that stalled much of their agendas137—oversaw dramatic rises in the size and scope of the administrative
state. After Bush’s vigorous use of executive orders and signing statements
stoked deep controversy,138 Obama doubled down on his predecessor’s reliance on executive agencies after his party was delivered a sharp rebuke in a
historic 2010 election that enabled congressional Republicans to thwart
much of his agenda during the remaining six years of his presidency.139 At
his wit’s end with Republican opposition in 2014, Obama famously issued the
following declaration, foreshadowing the aggressive regulatory approach he
would adopt during the final two years of his presidency:
We are not just going to be waiting for legislation in order to make sure
that we’re providing Americans the kind of help that they need. I’ve got a
pen, and I’ve got a phone. And I can use that pen to sign executive orders and
take executive actions and administrative actions that move the ball
forward.140
136 These advantages are surely debatable. Indeed, reasonable minds can disagree as to
the economic and political value of imposing such far-flung regulations that cost the American economy an estimated $1.88 trillion in 2014 alone. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY STATE 2 (2015), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202016%20-%20May%204%202016.pdf.
This Note sets that discussion aside, assuming arguendo that the benefits commonly associated with delegation are indeed beneficial.
137 See, e.g., Lauren French, Congress Setting New Bar for Doing Nothing, POLITICO (Mar.
21, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-donothing-221057; Peter Grier, Democrats Unrelenting in Oversight of Bush Administration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2008/0805/
p02s04-uspo.html.
138 See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Bush’s Tactic of Refusing Laws Is Probed, WASH. POST
(July 24, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/
AR2006072300511.html (“A panel of legal scholars and lawyers assembled by the American
Bar Association is sharply criticizing the use of ‘signing statements’ by President Bush that
assert his right to ignore or not enforce laws passed by Congress.”).
139 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power,
Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html (“Mr. Obama will leave the White
House as one of the most prolific authors of major regulations in presidential history.”);
Timothy Noah, Obama Pushing Thousands of New Regulations in Year 8, POLITICO (Jan. 4,
2016), http://www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/2016/1/obama-regulations-2016
(“Nearly 4,000 regulations are squirming their way through the federal bureaucracy in the
last year of Barack Obama’s presidency—many costing industry more than $100 million—
in a mad dash by the White House to push through government actions affecting everything from furnaces to gun sales to Guantánamo.”).
140 Rebecca Kaplan, Obama: I Will Use My Pen and Phone to Take on Congress, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-i-will-use-my-pen-and-phone-totake-on-congress/ (emphasis added).
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If presidents are tempted to test the bounds of executive authority, it is
tough to blame them. But, as the executive branch and the administrative
state it oversees grow in boldness, the need for narrow and principled limitations on Chevron is heightened. This recognition has motivated certain members of the Supreme Court to take a harder look at Chevron in recent years.
Chief Justice Roberts, for one, has recognized that “Chevron is a powerful
weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal.”141 Citing James Madison’s classic
observation that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny”142 in his dissent in City of Arlington, the Chief Justice noted that
although “[i]t would be a bit much” to suggest that Madison’s fears have yet
been realized, “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative
state cannot be dismissed.”143 In another recent case, Justice Thomas went
so far as to suggest that the Court has “come to countenance” “potentially
unconstitutional delegations . . . in the name of Chevron deference.”144
Judge Neil Gorsuch seems to agree with Justice Thomas,145 and will likely
join the Court with serious doubts about Chevron in tow.146
Whatever the depth of these sentiments in the federal judiciary as a
whole, it seems increasingly clear that at some point a regulatory question is
so big and important that the general calculus we have come to accept under
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States147 and Chevron changes. That is to say
that, at some point, in deferring to an administrative agency over a statutory
ambiguity implicating a policy question of tremendous significance, Congress
and federal courts abdicate their respective constitutional duties to make and
interpret the law.
As discussed in Part I, the feeble nondelegation doctrine set forth by
J.W. Hampton and the tremendous deference afforded to agencies under
Chevron have allowed executive agencies to surpass their counterparts in the
legislative branch in practical policymaking power. It seems obvious enough
to most that this modern arrangement skirts Article I of the Constitution,
which purports in its very first non-prefatory clause to vest “[a]ll legislative
Powers . . . in a Congress of the United States.”148
Knowledgeable observers of the undeniable reality that executive agencies exercise quasi-legislative powers “all the time”149 fall essentially into three
camps. Virtually impossible to find in the corpus of literature are those that
141 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
142 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271 (James Madison) (ABA 2009).
143 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
144 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
145 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
146 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
147 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
149 Thanks to the great Professor William Kelley for this helpful characterization.
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either deny outright the constitutionality of any delegation whatsoever,150 or
those who view delegation as so affirmatively desirable as to pose no problem
at all. Most observers, then, land somewhere in the middle of these opposing
views151—acknowledging that delegation has its benefits and is practically
necessary, but conceding that it also distorts the text and history of the Constitution to at least some extent and raises constitutional concerns in certain
situations.
This middle ground is precisely where a principled major question
exception operates. The exception embraced by the Court in King is born of
a recognition that although the vast majority of run-of-the-mill legal interpretations by agencies fit the reasonable scheme we have adopted quite neatly,
some interpretive questions are of such major importance as to belie the
notion that Congress has not already attempted to—or would not otherwise
make time to—answer the question itself. The task of answering such questions is wholly Congress’s prerogative under Article I of the Constitution.152
Any executive authority to craft policy details and interpret statutory ambiguity is a gift of Congress, not an entitlement.153 Indeed, the very basis for
Chevron deference is the idea that executive agencies are entitled deference
where Congress intends them to issue binding policy details.154
Congressional attempts to rein in executive agencies are largely ineffectual. The once-effective legislative veto has been ruled unconstitutional,155
and Congress has little appetite for defunding or abolishing agencies that
overstep the bounds of their organic statutes. Proposed legislative fixes156
and other congressional tools such as appropriations riders, budget cuts, and
committee subpoenas are often challenging to enact and tend to be of limited utility.157 By invoking the major question exception, federal courts can
150 Professor Philip Hamburger, for one, has argued that administrative power “runs
outside the law.” See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 6 (2014).
151 Including the Supreme Court’s controlling “intelligible principle” standard. See
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
152 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
153 Indeed, Congress can settle a statutory ambiguity any way it pleases any time it
wants. It can also eliminate an agency’s legal authority in the first place by repealing its
organic statute—subject to a presidential veto, of course. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and
until Congress confers power on it.”).
154 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
155 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
156 See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Congress (2017)
(ambitious bill combining a handful of regulatory reforms sought by House Republicans in
prior Congresses); Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R.
26, 115th Congress (2017) (bill requiring joint resolution of approval before any “major
rule” may take effect and defining as “major” any rule “likely to result in . . . an annual
effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more” or likely to be sufficiently significant
according to other specified criteria).
157 Consider, for example, the treacherous journey to enactment faced by the House’s
latest attempt at regulatory reform—even in a relatively friendly political environment.
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save Congress the trouble of exercising the limited tools at its disposal in
order to check agencies.
B.

Solution: A Judicially Manageable Major Question Exception

While a robust major question exception is far from the only practical
mechanism for curbing the aforementioned administrative excesses, it is
among the best for two primary reasons: first, its effectiveness is not handicapped by the shortcomings of the foregoing congressional powers; and second, if applied correctly, it affects only those rare agency statutory
interpretations that a reviewing court deems sufficiently important to trigger
the exception.
Before proceeding, however, an initial concession is in order. A primary
concern with any exception to a background rule like Chevron is the exception’s tendency to diminish the strength and consistency of the rule.158 This
understanding animated Justice Scalia’s consistent aversion to standards,159
Although the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 successfully passed the House only
eight days into the 115th Congress, it must now confront a Senate where a pitched battle
over President Donald Trump’s replacement of Justice Scalia looms large, and where a
crushing backlog of judicial nominations is almost sure to dominate the law-related agenda
for at least some time. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Judging Trump: Supreme Court Choice on PresidentElect’s Immediate Agenda, FOX NEWS (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2016/11/24/judging-trump-supreme-court-choice-on-president-elects-immediate-agenda
.html; Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More than 100 Court Vacancies, Plans
to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
tics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-court-vacancies-plans-to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/
25/d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html (“The estimated 103 judicial
vacancies that President Obama is expected to hand over to Trump in the Jan. 20 transition of power is nearly double the 54 openings Obama found eight years ago”). Where
regulatory reform ranks among the wide-ranging priorities of congressional leadership is
another question mark, and it remains to be seen how Trump might respond if presented
with a bill whose unhidden purpose is to step on his branch’s toes by impeding the regulatory agendas of his and future administrations. See, e.g., David Weigel, Claiming Mandate,
GOP Congress Lays Plans to Propel Sweeping Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/claiming-mandate-gop-congress-lays-plans-topropel-sweeping-conservative-agenda/2017/01/01/9840338a-ceee-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b043
6f_story.html. Of course, Senate Democrats may use the filibuster to prevent a vote on the
bill in the first place. See id. (“[N]one [of the GOP’s regulatory reform agenda] has much
buy-in from Democrats. Just one rural Democrat in the 115th Congress . . . voted for [a
similar bill taken up by the 114th Congress].”). Or the bill may die on its merits in the
Senate regardless. Id. This Note takes no position on the merits of this legislation, but
assumes arguendo that the enormous challenge of successfully aligning this unpredictable
collection of moving parts will thwart any attempts to alter the modern legal landscape in
which Chevron continues to reign supreme as discussed in Part I.
158 See generally Scalia, supra note 48.
159 See id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Vague standards
are manipulable.”).
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balancing tests,160 case-by-case inquiries,161 and unconstrained judicial discretion.162 This core philosophy also motivated Justice Scalia’s opposition to
rulings that muddled Chevron’s firm and simple two-step inquiry.163
The major question exception is not immune to this drawback. Its existence invites judicial discretion. But this Note contends that such discretion
can be exercised—as it is in innumerable other places in the law—in a judicially manageable way, and that any uncertainty accompanying such discretion is welcome in comparison to the alternative of an administrative state
that will only continue to increase in size and aggressiveness.164 The more
we come to rely on regulation, the harder it is to rid ourselves of such regulation.165 And as the regulatory footprint of the federal bureaucracy expands
to an unprecedented level166 (and as presidents become increasingly aggressive in deploying executive power to fundamentally reshape major areas of
federal policy),167 the need to remember Article I’s Vesting Clause is as great
160 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Court has . . . replaced the clear constitutional prescription that the executive power
belongs to the President with a ‘balancing test.’”).
161 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]his court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts,
police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards
to be applied in differing factual circumstances.” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 181 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
162 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The ‘congruence and proportionality’ standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.”); Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 67 (“The Framers . . . were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.” (first
citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI (criminal jury trial); then citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII (civil
jury trial); and then citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 611–12 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))).
163 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 352 (1994) (“Although Chevron itself was decided before Justice Scalia joined the
Court, he has long been perceived as the Court’s most enthusiastic partisan of the two-step
method associated with the decision.” (citing Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1991) (“Justice Scalia is
a fierce, sometimes strident defender of Chevron.”))). There is, however, some evidence
that Scalia had begun to rethink Chevron before his death. See, e.g., John F. Manning, In
Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 n.29 (“In those days, Justice Scalia
was very keen on the Chevron doctrine.” (emphasis added) (citing Scalia, supra note 38, at
516–17)).
164 Here, a familiar aphorism comes to mind—the perfect is the enemy of good. “Striving to better, oft we mar what’s well.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4, l.23
(Burton Raffel ed., Yale Univ. Press 2007).
165 This may explain the Supreme Court’s constant willingness to “steadfastly [find]
intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish.” Lawson, supra note 14,
at 329.
166 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he federal bureaucracy continues to grow; in the last 15 years, Congress has launched
more than 50 new agencies.”).
167 President Obama’s unilateral immigration decrees are perhaps the clearest example
of this modern phenomenon. See, e.g., DAPA Memo, supra note 112; DACA Memo, supra

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL414.txt

1894

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

4-MAY-17

9:32

[vol. 92:4

as ever. A candid recognition that the modern administrative state stresses
the separation of powers and federal structure is neither novel nor controversial, and is not inconsistent with the practical acceptance that, in a great
majority of ordinary cases, regulation is vital and constitutionally appropriate.
Thus, this Note proposes the following framework. Where typical statutory ambiguities are at issue, deference should be widely available to agencies
subject only to the pair of low hurdles already in place: (1) J.W. Hampton’s
requirement that the statute from which the agency gleans its authority guide
the agency with a sufficiently “intelligible principle,”168 and (2) Chevron’s
requirement that the agency adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statutory
provision that is, in fact, ambiguous.169 However, where an agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity implicates a policy decision of “deep ‘economic
and political significance,’ ”170 reviewing courts should confidently withhold
Chevron deference as the Court did in King v. Burwell.171
This approach takes a significant step toward restoring the separation of
powers envisioned by the framers, and does not depart from the sound theoretical underpinnings of Chevron—what Congress says goes, and where Congress has spoken172 or presumably would have spoken had it foreseen the
statutory ambiguity at issue,173 its intent (like its lawmaking authority) is
supreme.
For the following reasons, this Note contends that the task of effectuating such intent is best lodged in federal courts. The first reason is practical—
courts are simply better than agencies at interpreting ambiguous statutory
note 113. A top priority of congressional Republicans and the new Trump Administration
will be to unwind Obama-era regulations, after the outgoing president laid hundreds of
“midnight” rules in place. See, e.g., Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2017, H.R. 21, 115th Congress (2017); John T. Bennett, GOP Mostly Powerless in Stopping Obama ‘Midnight’ Regulations,
ROLL CALL (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/gop-mostly-powerlessstopping-obama-midnight-regulations; Dave Boyer, Republicans Prepare to Repeal Regulations
as Obama Racks Up Record, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes
.com/news/2016/nov/21/obama-regulation-repeal-in-works/; Alexis Simendinger,
Obama: Busy with His Pen to the End, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www
.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/12/30/obama_busy_with_his_pen_to_the_end_1326
81.html.
168 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
169 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
170 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). Although it will admittedly behoove Congress
and the Supreme Court to make this trigger less “vague and difficult to administer,” such
clarification is to be expected in due time. See Note, The Rise of Purposivism and the Fall of
Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the Supreme Court, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1239 (2017).
171 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
172 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
173 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign [a major question] to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.” (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))); see also Breyer, supra note 37, at 370 (“Congress is more
likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”).
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provisions. The second is theoretical—since Congress orders federal courts
to review agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act174 anyway,
encouraging courts to resolve major questions of law adheres to Congress’s
original template for the maintenance of a workable administrative state.
And the third is structural—assigning courts the task of interpreting such
ambiguities allows courts to fulfill their proper role within our constitutional
structure.
1.

Courts Are Better Equipped to Effectively Ascertain and Effectuate
Congressional Intent

Chevron Step One instructs reviewing courts to “employ[ ] traditional
tools of statutory construction” in determining whether an agency’s interpretation is “contrary to clear congressional intent.”175 This approach follows
the “conventional” view176 that the essential task of statutory interpretation is
to “act as Congress’s faithful agent” by striving “to implement the commands
of the legislature.”177 Consequently, determining which of Congress’s coordinate branches is best qualified to be its most faithful agent is critical.
The major question exception, as applied in King, asserts that federal
courts—rather than agencies—ought to interpret and enforce congressional
intent where an implied delegation of interpretive authority to an agency is
unclear given the size and nature of the policy question at issue. This
approach is legally sound and does not upset “[t]he conventional wisdom”
that agency specialization accords agencies “greater ‘expertise’ than courts in
figuring out instrumental applications [of ambiguous organic statutes],”178
because any reasonable agency interpretation of a routine statutory ambiguity for which an implicit delegation on the part of Congress is clear remains
entitled to Chevron deference. Indeed, only where truly major questions are
involved does the judiciary’s comparative advantage in statutory interpretation come into play. For support of this proposition, we need only circle
back to the theoretical foundation of the major question exception—where a
question is so large as to undercut the threshold finding that Congress would
tolerate ceding its ultimate authority to resolve the question to an executive
agency, whatever advantage the agency enjoys in expertise and experience in
the policy area is irrelevant because Congress retains the final say under Article I.
174 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
175 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
176 Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112
(2010). The view that “federal courts function as the faithful agents of Congress is a conventional one” because Article I assigns exclusive lawmaking authority to Congress. Id.
177 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1501, 1502 (2006).
178 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
411, 421.
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Because of its aforementioned practical constraints, Congress must often
rely on a faithful agent to allow it that “final say” by discerning and enforcing
its statutory meaning. There are at least two strong practical reasons for concluding that federal courts are better equipped to provide such a service to
Congress.
First, while administrative agencies are staffed primarily by technocrats
and bureaucrats, federal courts are staffed by experienced judges and talented law clerks.179 Second, federal courts are better practiced in the art of
statutory interpretation, as they are confronted with statutory ambiguities on
a far more regular basis. Compare, for instance, the relative Chevron-related
workloads of the EPA—one of the administrative state’s most prolific rule
issuers—and the D.C. Circuit—the federal court of appeals most frequently
charged with reviewing federal regulations. Over the past three years, the
EPA has been party to only twelve of the seventy-seven cases in which the D.C.
Circuit cited Chevron.180 This discrepancy stems from the fact that while the
EPA is responsible for resolving ambiguities in only the small handful of
organic statutes relevant to its mandate, the D.C. Circuit is responsible for
assessing the reasonableness of statutory interpretations in a far broader
range of scenarios.
This edge in legal talent and interpretive experience accords federal
courts a comparative advantage over agencies in ascertaining and effectuating congressional intent. Congress’s ability to cede interpretive authority to
federal agencies is without question, but where a question is so major that
such an intent cannot be clearly imputed to Congress, one of Congress’s
coordinate branches must step in to faithfully interpret its work. Courts are
best equipped to do so, and the major question exception empowers them to
do just that. By acknowledging its comparative advantage in statutory interpretation and reserving its constitutional authority to interpret highly important statutory ambiguities under its ultimate authority to “say what the law
is,”181 the federal judiciary can ensure that the very best reading of Congress’s work is elucidated when interpretive questions of extraordinary economic and political significance arise.
2.

The APA Mandates Judicial Review of Agency Action

Chevron deference has always had an uneasy relationship with the
Administrative Procedure Act,182 which provides that: “To the extent neces179 See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Rat Race: An Insider’s Guide on Landing Judicial
Clerkships, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 835, 838 (2006) (“[C]lerkships are extremely competitive.
Applicants are competing against hundreds of other top students from law schools across
the country.”).
180 Westlaw search, Feb. 2017.
181 See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
182 Judge Gorsuch’s concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch brings this tension into
clear relief. See 834 F.3d 1142, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (observing the “riddle” in which courts “are not fulfilling [the] duty” “expressly assigned to them
by the APA and . . . often . . . compelled by the Constitution itself” “to interpret the law”).
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sary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, [and] . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions.”183 Thus,
statutes “would seem to be bound by Congress vesting ultimate interpretive
authority in the reviewing court, unless the statute explicitly specified that
the agency was to have such authority.”184 Because “[v]irtually no statutes do
so,”185 the Supreme Court has been forced to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between Chevron’s command to reviewing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of genuine statutory ambiguities and APA section
706’s command to reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of
law.”186
The Supreme Court offered its most explicit explanation in United States
v. Mead Corp.187 Chief Justice Roberts summed up the Court’s reasoning in
that case in his City of Arlington dissent: “We do not ignore [the APA’s] command when we afford an agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference;
we respect it. We give binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to interpret those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’ ”188
Another prominent conceptualization asserts that Chevron Step Two is “nothing more than standard arbitrary and capricious review” as mandated by section 706(2)(a) of the APA.189
Whatever the strength of these explanations,190 the continued vitality of
the APA nevertheless suggests that Congress envisions federal courts playing
a substantial role in confining delegated administrative power. In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act191 and showed through a “combined use of Skidmore deference, the
APA’s substantial-evidence standard, and oblique references to Chevron in the
same statutory section” that it “is not troubled by Chevron’s apparent inconsis183 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
184 Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 278–79 (2011).
185 Id. at 279.
186 Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984), with 5 U.S.C. § 706.
187 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
188 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 229) (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1983) (“[T]he court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to ‘say what the law is’ by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply
applying the law as ‘made’ by the authorized law-making entity.”)).
189 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 604 n.28 (citing Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1296 (1997)). For a
more thorough summary of this view by a prominent commentator, see Gary S. Lawson,
Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1377, 1377–80 (1997).
190 Numerous commentators have argued that Chevron deference contravenes the
APA’s judicial review provisions. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193–99 (1998).
191 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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tency with the APA.”192 Congress’s decision to tolerate the ongoing coexistence of Chevron, Skidmore, and the APA’s judicial review provisions indicates
that Congress wants both of its coordinate branches to help resolve ambiguities in its work product.193
The major question exception accommodates this apparent goal of Congress by calling on courts to supersede interpretive authority delegated to the
executive only where the interpretive question at issue is of such a major
nature as to undermine the threshold finding that Congress intended to
make such a delegation in the first place. Given Congress’s continued reliance on the APA’s judicial review framework—and its modern re-visitation of
the issue in Dodd-Frank—it is clear that federal courts have at least some role
to play in resolving statutory ambiguities. Urging courts to intervene where
such a resolution is sure to effect a major change in federal policy furthers
this congressional goal and provides Congress its best chance at having its
intent with the provision at issue enforced without having to subsequently
resort to amending an interpretation with which it disagrees. The competing
suggestion that administrative agencies have exclusive authority to resolve all
statutory ambiguities subject only to Chevron’s lax requirements194 is a far
more difficult case to make in light of the APA.195

192 Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015); see 12 U.S.C. § 25b
(2012).
193 If anything, Congress’s approach in Dodd-Frank solidifies the executive branch’s
role in the interpretive process, as it explicitly declares a congressional intent to delegate
interpretive authority to agencies where such authority has long been thought to rest on a
“legal fiction” of such congressional intent. See Barnett, supra note 192, at 7 n.25. Regardless, with respect to a vast majority of the broad range of current organic statutes enacted
prior to Dodd-Frank, such authority is still premised on a legal fiction. See, e.g., David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212
(acknowledging that “Congress . . . rarely makes its intentions about deference clear”);
Seidenfeld, supra note 184, at 278 (observing similarly that “Congress does not directly
address the question of which institution—agency or court—is authorized to fill gaps or
resolve ambiguities in the vast majority of regulatory statutes”).
194 Under Chevron, a reviewing court “need not conclude that the agency construction
was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11
(1984) (first citing FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39
(1981); then citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978); then
citing Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); then citing Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); then citing Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329
U.S. 143, 153–54 (1946); and then citing McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480–81
(1921)). Instead, the court must conclude that the agency’s interpretation was merely one
of a handful of reasonable interpretations. See id. This is a low bar for agencies to clear.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE
L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006) (“Chevron means that courts must uphold reasonable agency interpretations even if they would reject those interpretations on their own.”).
195 See generally Duffy, supra note 190.
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Historical Practice and Constitutional Structure Encourage Courts to
Assume Interpretive Authority over Questions of Extraordinary
Significance

In his dissent in City of Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts offered a helpful
reminder of the federal judiciary’s proper role in Chevron cases.196 Building
off his most famous predecessor’s declaration that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”197 Roberts framed the core principle that animates the major question exception:
A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own,
that the agency is entitled to deference. Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when and because Congress has conferred on the agency
interpretive authority over the question at issue. An agency cannot exercise
interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys
that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the
agency.198

The framers carefully designed the Constitution’s structure under an
ever-present understanding that centralized power is the enemy of liberty.199
Just as the framers “deci[ded] that the legislative power of the Federal government [must] be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure,”200 their design of the Constitution
compels the judiciary to carefully “guard its role”201 as “the final arbiter of
the meaning of the Constitution.”202 The major question exception offers
federal courts a tangible and manageable vehicle for doing so.
Former House Speaker John Boehner was right to warn that “[i]f [President Obama] can get away with making his own laws, future presidents will
have the ability to as well.” His reminder that “[t]he House has an obligation
to stand up for the Constitution” was equally correct,203 but federal courts
bear such an obligation as well. Several commentators have suggested that
196 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–86 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
197 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J., majority
opinion).
198 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
199 See generally 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748) (warning against the tendency of the legislative and
executive powers to blend in republican governments); see also Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1,
18 (1990) (observing Montesquieu’s tremendous influence over the American Founders).
200 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
201 Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the “Law
of Nations” in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 153, 154 (1998).
202 Andrew T. Bond, Note, Parting the Chevron Sea: An Argument for Chevron’s Greater
Applicability to Cabinet than Independent Agencies, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 408 (2014).
203 Elise Viebeck, House Republicans Sue President Obama, HILL (Nov. 21, 2014), http://
thehill.com/policy/healthcare/224992-house-republicans-file-suit-against-obama. Of
course, this view is dearly held on both sides of the aisle, and the same must be said for all
presidents.
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Chevron deference contravenes Marbury and entails an unlawful abdication of
this duty.204 This Note makes no such contention—where the “resolution of
statutory ambiguities requires . . . resolving ‘competing interests,’ ”205 the
executive’s political accountability and comparative advantage in technical
expertise generally justifies the judiciary’s deference to its judgment.206
The major question exception acknowledges the functional wisdom
behind congressional delegation and Chevron deference and does not undermine Chevron in the vast run of cases. It does, however, propose that in some
cases of a truly extraordinary nature Congress would not—or at least should
not—stomach such a delegation.
But might this discussion shroud a more fundamental point? Perhaps
some interpretive questions may not legitimately be left to the executive in
the first instance due to the sheer national significance of the policy decisions their resolution will entail. This suggestion has several analogues in
constitutional law. The political question doctrine207 and the various protections of certain executive officers from congressional removal208 are but a
few.
204 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003)
(“Chevron’s command to courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of
statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with [Marbury].” (citations omitted)); Harold M.
Greenberg, Why Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79
TENN. L. REV. 573, 604 (2012) (acknowledging that “the coexistence of the Chevron and
Marbury conventions [may be] . . . problematic.” (citations omitted)); Jonathan T. Molot,
Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1262 (2002) (“The concern
among scholars and judges that Chevron may have gone too far in relinquishing judicial
authority . . . may be motivated in part by an underlying sense that Chevron’s surrender of
power is at odds with Marbury . . . .” (citations omitted)); Rossi, supra note 58, at 1108
(“Chevron . . . has taken on canonical status as the ‘counter-Marbury.’” (citations omitted));
Sunstein, supra note 194, at 2589 (“Chevron is properly understood as a kind of counterMarbury for the administrative state.”). See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986).
205 See Sunstein, supra note 194, at 2587.
206 See id. at 2587–88; see also Bond, supra note 202, at 408 (“[T]he proper way to view
Chevron[ ] . . . is to contextualize the case as one that upheld the judiciary’s power to say
what the law is (but to cabin its ability to draft judicial legislation and policy).”).
207 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (holding that where “a matter has . . .
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government” it is a nonjusticiable political question); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 252–53 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring) (“[T]he political question doctrine is ‘essentially a function of the separation of powers’ . . . existing to restrain courts ‘from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government.” (first quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; and then
quoting United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990))).
208 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496
(2010) (holding that multi-layer for-cause removal protections imposed by Congress contravened “Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (acknowledging that the critical issue in removal cases is
determining whether “Congress [has] interfere[d] with the President’s exercise of the
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This Note raises this possibility purely for the sake of argument, as its
assertion invites an illustrative rejoinder: If a policy choice is so important
that Congress cannot vest its resolution in the executive branch, then why
should the judicial branch claim the authority to make such a policy choice in
selecting an interpretation of the ambiguous provision at issue? The simplest
answer is that federal judges are not exercising policymaking power when
they invoke the major question exception, but are instead allowing (or
requiring) Congress to make the relevant policy choice by faithfully interpreting the ambiguous language at issue in a way that best suits Congress’s intent
and meaning.209
Given the Court’s habit of upholding congressional delegations of practically any “intelligib[ility],”210 ambiguous statutory provisions abound.211 In
the face of such ambiguity, Congress needs another branch to function as its
handmaiden in statutory interpretation. Most commonly, Congress invites
the executive to perform this task.212 This frequent arrangement brings myriad functional benefits, but places commensurate strain on the balance and
separation of federal powers. For its part, Chevron fosters deeper imbalance
among the branches by affording agencies even greater leeway in federal
policymaking.213 The federal judiciary has a constitutional duty to ease such
disparities, and the major question exception provides an effective and (relatively) undisruptive mechanism for doing so.
But this raises a final concern: Does the exception grant judges undue
discretion to overturn reasonable agency interpretations under the guise of
“majorness?”214 Acknowledging that this difficulty is probably unavoidable,
‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be
faithfully executed’ under Article II”).
209 This argument relies on this Note’s prior assertion that federal courts are better
than agencies at “using dictionaries, consulting statutory structure, deploying canons of
construction, [and/or] relying on legislative history” in order to correctly resolve statutory
ambiguities. Sunstein, supra note 194, at 2587. But see id. at 2582 (arguing that “[t]here is
no reason to believe that in the face of statutory ambiguity, the meaning of federal law
should be settled by the inclinations and predispositions of federal judges.”).
210 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); supra notes
17–25 and accompanying text.
211 Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118
(2016) (book review) (“Several substantive principles of interpretation—such as constitutional avoidance, use of legislative history, and Chevron—depend on an initial determination of whether a text is clear or ambiguous.”).
212 See supra Part I.
213 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“[Chevron] certainly seems to have added prodigious new powers to an
already titanic administrative state.”).
214 Justice Scalia would likely be first in line to raise this concern. See supra notes
159–63 and accompanying text. I take heart, however, in the fact that Scalia also sounded
the alarm that the administrative state of nearly three decades ago posed a grave threat to
American government, for “in the long run the improvisation of a constitutional structure
on the basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous.” Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Manning, supra note 163.
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this Note contends that the ends of working to preserve the separation of
powers justify the means of furnishing judges with the kind of discretion that
may enable occasional arbitrariness and capriciousness.
Judicial discretion is present in a bevy of areas in the law,215 most notably in the law of civil procedure, which provides the very cornerstone of civil
litigation.216 Federal judges routinely manage such discretion in a responsible manner and can do likewise with King’s major question exception.
Courts can also be counted on to develop doctrines to guide future applications of the major question exception as they are presented with more cases
like Brown & Williamson and King.217 If we doubt their ability to do so, Article III and Chief Justice Marshall’s timeless words in Marbury should ease
these worries, for if federal courts have any constitutional role, it is to interpret and declare the meaning of the law.218
Congress also has an important role to play, as it may legislate a brightline rule for distinguishing ‘major’ questions from ‘nonmajor’ ones. It can
also overturn statutory interpretations with which it disagrees,219 and often
has in the past.220 In fact, even erroneous interpretations by reviewing courts
in major question cases will generate a positive byproduct, forcing Congress
to take up the important policy question itself as the branch vested with
215 Justice Frankfurter once observed the inescapable nature of judicial discretion. See
Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (“There are
no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. . . . [W]e cannot escape . . .
the use of undefined defining terms.”).
216 See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198 (1989) (“While only ten of the 86 [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] use[ ] the term discretion explicitly, the courts of appeals soon identified
at least forty rules that were thought to repose discretion in the district court.” (citing
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 655 (1971))).
217 The clear-statement rule announced in another recent case provides an initial
example of the kind of standards courts can draw. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134
S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))).
218 Additional comfort for those skittish to vest such discretion in federal courts can be
drawn from the general agreement among federal judges with Justice Thomas’s following
description of the judicial role. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he law before the Court today ‘is . . . uncommonly silly’ . . . . [and] [i]f
I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it. . . . Notwithstanding
this, I recognize that as a Member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners
and others similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to ‘decide cases “agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”’” (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
219 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It obviously has
the power to correct our mistakes.”), superseded by statute as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
220 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
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exclusive legislative authority221 and the branch most politically accountable
to the people.222
The particular contours of these practical solutions are for courts and
Congress to develop, but in any case, the major question exception’s positive
impact on the separation of powers is alone sufficient to justify a reinvigorated reliance on the exception in the aftermath of King. Here again,
increased acceptance of the exception may offer the solution, for as the
exception is invoked more frequently, Congress and the Supreme Court will
be compelled to curb the judicial discretion inherent in the triggering
phrase “deep ‘economic and political significance’ ”223 by laying down legislative markers, hard dollar amounts, clarifying dicta, and the like.
CONCLUSION
Congress’s surrender of much of its legislative authority to the bloated
modern administrative state has, in the words of Justice Scalia, created “a sort
of junior-varsity Congress”224 that imperils the separation of powers. As Congress’s dependence on executive agencies deepens, so too does an ever-growing stream of regulations that reshape American policy in a manner that the
framers deemed best left to the legislature.225 With increasing regularity,
Congress and the federal judiciary have also begun to accommodate the
executive’s desire to enact broad and sweeping changes to the economic and
political landscape unilaterally.226 These modern developments underscore
221 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
222 Consider, for instance, the following real-life example. Should federal tax credits
be extended to residents of states that have declined to establish health insurance
exchanges? Congress can and should answer this major question itself if a reviewing court
is unable to do so effectively in its interpretation of whatever language Congress has
already put on the books with respect to the issue. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015).
223 Id. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
(2000)).
224 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (ABA 2009) (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”).
226 Congressional decisions like that of House Republicans to sue the Obama Administration over President Obama’s extensive unilateral immigration actions are few and far
between, and are often met with harsh criticism. See David G. Savage, Judge Allows Unusual
House GOP Lawsuit Against President to Proceed, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www
.latimes.com/nation/la-na-obamacare-gop-lawsuit-20150909-story.html (“Many lawyers saw
the House suit as unprecedented.”); Elise Viebeck, House Republicans Sue President Obama,
HILL (Nov. 21, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/224992-house-republicansfile-suit-against-obama. While agencies have always—appropriately in most situations—
borne the political character of the incumbent administration, they are beginning to
reflect the hyper-partisanship and -politicization of the rest of the modern political world
with increasing regularity. Then-Justice Rehnquist candidly recognized the tendency of
agencies to behave politically in 1983. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The agency’s changed view . . . seems to be related to the election of a
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the need for federal courts to reassert their constitutional authority to check
the power of administrative agencies—even in some cases that would initially
appear to fall within the sacred “domain” of Chevron.227
While gradual refinement of its triggering phrase is admittedly necessary, the Supreme Court’s most recent iteration of the exception in King v.
Burwell228 provides an ideal mechanism for doing so. Where a statutory
ambiguity creates a policy question of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’ ”229 reviewing courts should refrain from granting agency interpretations Chevron deference in the absence of a threshold determination that
Congress has delegated the resolution of such a question to the agency
(absent a textual suggestion to the contrary). Chevron deference is predicated on such a delegation,230 and is not warranted where the ambiguous
language at issue suggests to a reviewing court that Congress would prefer to
answer the question itself. Answering such policy questions is Congress’s
constitutional role, and preserving the Constitution’s careful separation of
powers is the judiciary’s. King v. Burwell’s version of the major question
exception provides federal courts a major opportunity to fulfill this constitutional duty.
A look at the exception’s unsatisfying alternatives reveals its beauty.
While a wholesale rejection of the exception would promise the executive
even greater leeway in selecting interpretations that alter American policy in
a fundamental way, a wholesale rejection of Chevron would at best cause the
sort of stare decisis turmoil inevitably provoked by the fall of a case of Chevron’s exceptional influence,231 and would at worst throw the baby—the
countless ordinary agency statutory interpretations that have long been
deemed constitutional and essential to modern governance232—out with the
new President of a different political party.”). Rehnquist subsequently observed that “[a]
change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations,” but it is certainly debatable whether resolutions of statutory ambiguities entailing policy decisions of extraordinarily high stakes are better left to Congress
and courts as Congress’s faithful agents. Id. This Note argues as much.
227 King v. Burwell was such a case. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 375 (4th Cir.
2014) (affording IRS’s interpretation Chevron deference); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390,
402 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (analyzing the provision at issue under the Chevron framework but
withholding deference from IRS’s interpretation because “the meaning of section 36B
appears plain”).
228 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
229 Id. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
(2000)).
230 See id.; Sunstein, supra note 16, at 192, 198 (“Courts defer to agency interpretations
of law when, and because, Congress has told them to do so.”).
231 See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1463–68 (2013)
(recounting various theoretical justifications of stare decisis).
232 As on prior occasions, this Note assumes arguendo that the modern arrangement
under Chevron is indeed a practical necessity. As Judge Gorsuch has suggested, life would
surely go on without Chevron. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th
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bathwater. The major question exception resides in the palatable middle
ground between these uncomfortable extremes, and federal courts should
apply it confidently in the future.

Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“We managed to live with the administrative state
before Chevron. We could do it again.”).
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